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The Email Mining Toolkit (EMT) is a data mining system that computes behavior profiles or models of user 
email accounts. These models may be used for a multitude of tasks including forensic analyses and detection 
tasks of value to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as other typical tasks such as virus and 
spam detection. To demonstrate the power of the methods, we focus on the application of these models to detect 
the early onset of a viral propagation without "content-based" (or signature-based) analysis in common use in 
virus scanners.  We present several experiments using real email from 15 users with injected simulated viral 
emails and describe how the combination of different behavior models improves overall detection rates. The 
performance results vary depending upon parameter settings, approaching 99% true positive (TP) (percentage of 
viral emails caught) in general cases and with 0.38% false positive(FP) (percentage of emails with attachments 
that are mislabeled as viral). The models used for this study are based upon volume and velocity statistics of a 
user’s email rate and an analysis of the user’s (social) cliques revealed in their email behavior. We show by way 
of simulation that virus propagations are detectable since viruses may emit emails at rates different than human 
behavior suggests is normal, and email is directed to groups of recipients that violates the user’s typical 
communication with their social groups.  
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors: Security and privacy 
General Terms: Email Virus Propagations, Behavior Profiling 




1. INTRODUCTION  
This paper describes the detection capabilities of the Email Mining Toolkit 
(EMT). EMT provides the means of loading, parsing and analyzing email logs in a wide 
range of formats.  Many tools and techniques have been available from the fields of 
Information Retrieval and Natural Language Processing for analyzing documents of 
various sorts, including emails. EMT, however, extends these kinds of content-based 
analyses with an entirely new set of analyses that model “user behavior”. EMT models 
the behavior of individual user email accounts, or groups of accounts, including the 
“social cliques” revealed by a user’s email behavior. EMT’s design has been driven by 
the core security application to detect virus propagations, “spambot” activity and security 
policy violations. However, the technology also provides critical intelligence gathering 
and forensic analysis capabilities for agencies to analyze disparate Internet data sources 
for the detection of malicious users, attackers, and other targets of interest. The multiple 
uses of EMT are graphically displayed in Figure 1. For example, one target application 
for intelligence gathering supported by EMT is the identification of likely “proxy email 
accounts”, email accounts that exhibit similar behavior and thus may be used by a single 
person attempting to avoid detection. Although EMT has been designed specifically for 
email analysis, the principles of its operation are equally relevant to other internet audit 
sources.  
 
Figure 1. Overview of email behavior modeling, architecture  and applications. 
 
This data mining technology has been proven to automatically compute or create both 
signature-based misuse detection and anomaly detection-based misuse discovery.  The 
application of this technology to diverse Internet objects and events (e.g., email and web 
transactions) allows for a broad range of behavior-based analyses including the detection 
of proxy email accounts and groups of user accounts that communicate with one another 
including possibly covert group activities. 
Behavior-based misuse detection can provide important new assistance for counter-
terrorism intelligence by automatically detecting certain patterns across user accounts that 
are indicative of covert, malicious or counter-intelligence activities.  Moreover, behavior-
based detection provides workbench functionalities to interactively assist an intelligence 
agent with targeted investigations and off-line forensics analyses.  
Intelligence officers have a myriad of tasks and problems confronting them each day. 
The sheer volume of source materials requires a means of honing in on those sources of 
maximal value to their mission. A variety of techniques can be applied drawing upon the 
research and technology developed in the field of Information Retrieval. There is, 
however, an additional source of information available that can be used to aid even the 
simplest task of rank ordering and sorting documents for inspection: behavior models 
associated with the documents can be used to identify and group sources in interesting 
new ways. This is demonstrated by EMT that applies a variety of data mining techniques 
for profiling and behavior modeling of email sources.   
Behavior-based misuse detection is more robust against standard knowledge-based 
techniques. Behavior-based detection has the capabilities to detect new patterns (i.e., 
patterns that have not been previously observed), provide early warning alerts to users 
and analysts based upon detection of changes in behavior, and automatically adapt to 
both normal and misuse behavior.  By applying statistical techniques over actual system 
and user account behavior measurements, automatically-generated models are tuned to 
the particular source material.  This process, in turn, avoids the human bias that is 
intrinsic when misuse signatures, patterns and other knowledge-based models are 
designed by hand, as is the norm. 
Despite this, no general infrastructure has been developed for the systematic 
application of behavior-based detection across a broad set of detection and intelligence 
analysis tasks such as fraudulent Internet activities, virus detection, intrusion detection 
and user account profiling.  Today's Internet security systems are specialized to apply a 
small range of techniques, usually knowledge-based, to an individual misuse detection 
problem, such as intrusion, virus or SPAM detection. Behavior-based detection 
technology as proposed herein will likely provide a quantum leap in security and in 
intelligence analysis in both offline and online task environments.  
Table 1 enumerates a range of behavior-based Internet applications. These 
applications cover a set of detection, security and marketing applications that exist within 
the government, commercial and private sectors.  Each of these applications are within 
the capabilities of behavior-based techniques by applying data mining algorithms over 
appropriate audit data sources.   
Table 1 – General Behavior-Based Analysis Internet Applications. 
 
The diversity of these applications also spans national security concerns in ways 
that may not be immediately apparent. Consider spam detection for example. Spam 
continues to be a scourge upon users of the internet, consuming enormous bandwidth and 
reducing productivity of corporate email users. However, spam may also present a 
national security issue when employed by terrorists in blended attacks, that combine 
physical with cyber attack events, as a “force multiplier”. Imagine a terror attack upon 
some critical infrastructure of the US followed by a flooding of spam emails warming 
citizens that schools and children may be targeted next. The psychological operations (or 
psychops) of terrorism would be greatly enhanced by spam, and hence spam detection 
and filtering may ultimately be considered a national security priority. (Indeed, web sites 
like Spammimic provide the means of encoding secret messages to look like spam 
allowing nefarious broadcast secret messages to go unnoticed.)  
EMT is an offline system applied to email files gathered from server logs or 
client email programs. EMT computes information about email flows from and to email 
accounts, aggregate statistical information from groups of accounts, and analyzes content 
fields of emails. The EMT system provides temporal statistical feature computations and 
behavior-based modeling techniques, through an interactive user interface to enable 
targeted intelligence investigations and semi-manual forensic analysis of email files. 
EMT provides the following functionalities, interactively: 
• Querying a database (warehouse) of email data and computed feature values, 
including: 
• Ordering and sorting emails on the basis of content analysis (n-gram analysis, 
keyword spotting, and classifications of email supported by an integrated supervised 
learning feature using Naïve Bayes classifier trained on user selected features) 
• Historical features that profile user groups by statistically measuring behavior 
characteristics. 
• User models that group users according to features such as typical emailing 
patterns (as represented by histograms over different selectable statistics), and email 
communities (including the “social cliques” revealed in email exchanges between email 
accounts. 
• Applying statistical models to email data to alert on abnormal or unusual email 
events. 
• Analysis of the rank order or relative importance of individuals in an organization 
based upon their membership in many groups, and the “response rates” to their emails 
exhibited by their coworkers.  
To demonstrate the power of the behavior-modeling techniques of EMT and the 
variety of functions and features it provides, this paper details a common email detection 
problem familiar to all users, virus detection. Detecting viral, and spam emails are 
important in their own right. The economic loses due to worm and virus email 
propagations are estimated to be $13B in 2003 alone. Viruses and spam emails consume 
bandwidth, deny service, and damage systems. Most approaches to virus and spam 
detection are based on content filtering techniques. Here we demonstrate the power of 
behavior based techniques for virus detection in particular.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the virus 
detection problem and introduces how behavior-based methods may be employed to 
detect the early onset of a viral propagation. Section 3 describes related research on 
anomaly detection in intrusion detection systems from which this work was originally 
conceived. Section 4 provides an overview of EMT’s features and details three different 
kinds of behavior models supported by EMT and their use in virus detection. The first 
model we discus is a user’s (social) cliques revealed in their email behavior, and an 
independent test of this model shows that viral emails violate a user’s email clique 
behavior. We then detail a frequency-based model of the user’s typical recipients, and 
likewise a simulated test showing how this model may detect viral email propagations. 
We also present an experiment where these two models are combined for better detection 
performance and reduced false alarm rates. Section 4 concludes with another statistical 
model, a cumulative distribution over outbound email recipients, and a final performance 
evaluation of the correlation of all three models producing our best results. Section 5 
concludes the paper with a discussion of future research and suggests how other EMT 
features have interesting uses in forensics and intelligence. 
 
2. DETECTING VIRUS BEHAVIOR 
By way of demonstration of the power of EMT’s behavior-based models, the rest of 
this paper is devoted to a detailed analysis and experimental evaluation of virus detection. 
Indeed, email is the dominant method of choice for the propagation of viruses and 
worms.  Typically, a virus will extract email addresses in an infected computer and send 
copies of itself to some or all of these addresses. These addresses may be obtained from 
many sources, such as the address book, socket-layer sniffing, or a locally stored email 
archive. Virus scanners are signature-based, which means that they use a collection of 
byte sequences or embedded strings to identify known malicious attachments. If a virus 
scanner's signature database does not contain a signature for a malicious program, the 
virus scanner is unable to detect or protect against that malicious program. In general, to 
mitigate against this false negative problem, virus scanners require frequent updating of 
signature databases, otherwise the scanners become useless to detect new attacks.  
Similarly, security patches protect systems only when they have been written, distributed 
and applied to host systems in response to known attacks. Until then, systems remain 
vulnerable and attacks are able to propagate widely and rapidly over the internet. 
For example, the SoBig.F propagation that occurred in the late summer of 2003 
spread rapidly across the internet using a high speed spam-based propagation strategy. It 
took several days before an effective signature was available for distribution to locally 
update virus scanners to stop this virus. During this period of time no signature-based 
filters were available and SoBig.F flooded the internet causing remarkable damage and 
expense. It is this case of a new viral attack that is the subject matter of this work. 
Furthermore, virus writers have demonstrated their continual cleverness by thwarting 
virus scanners with strategies that defy signature-based detection. Stopping a 
polymorphic virus that uses several points of entry, and that also “morph” the contents of 
the virus in various ways, can be a daunting task using traditional signature-based virus 
scanning methods alone.   
Our core premise is that viral propagations fundamentally behave differently than 
typical human user email behavior. Thus, the idea is to train or learn a detector that 
models a user’s email behavior, and then to apply these models to the email flow of a 
user’s account to detect abnormal or anomalous email flows that may indicate a viral 
propagation has been initiated targeting the user as a new victim. Much prior work on 
anomaly detection systems has been reported in the literature to solve the false negative 
problem of signature-based detection systems in intrusion detection systems. Here, we 
apply this methodology to email. We believe EMT demonstrates a solution to raise the 
bar of protection to detect and extinguish viral propagations as early as possible until new 
signatures are developed and deployed. Consider the following observations.  
First, viral email propagations involve an email sent to or from a victim email account 
with either an attachment or with something equivalent to an HTML page in the text 
body. In the former case, the user will have to run the executable that launches a virus 
directly, or invoke a program that uses the seemingly innocent data file that exploits the 
weakness of the program that makes use of it. In the latter case, the user may simply click 
on an innocent appearing URL that may start the download and execution of “malware”.  
Second, it is highly unlikely a virus will propagate itself with only one or a few 
emails. This is because usually viruses are designed to infect as many computers as 
possible in a short period of time.  Otherwise, they would be stopped long before they 
have a chance to inflict damage to many systems. Creating many copies ensures the virus 
will propagate quickly and widely. We conjecture that the frequency of emissions of 
emails during a viral propagation will be substantially different than the victim user’s 
typical email rate (both inbound and outbound).  
Finally, a virus is ignorant of their victim’s behavior, in the sense that it does not 
know the relationship between a user and those with whom they communicate. For 
example, a user would be unlikely to send an email, or many copies of an email, to a 
large number of recipients among the user’s separate social cliques. Instead, a virus may 
use simple hard-coded rules in deciding whom to propagate to, violating the user’s 
typical behavior in sending emails among his/her social cliques. These observations 
suggest that viral propagations may be detected by profiling email behavior and using the 
user’s behavior models to detect the onset of a “randomly guided” virus propagation. 
Behavior-based detection is not a new concept. Credit card fraud detection [40] is 
perhaps the best example of a widely deployed security system that depends upon 
profiling behavior of credit card users. We posit that a similar approach directed towards 
“email transactions” will provide comparable broad-based security without requiring a 
complete overhaul of email protocols and server implementations.  
By measuring behavior of individual email users over time using different statistics 
and profiling techniques, and the probabilities associated with these statistics, we wish to 
correlate as much evidence from multiple models to accurately detect errant or malicious 
email while minimizing false alarms.  
Three types of behavior-based models are examined in detail: user cliques, the 
Hellinger distance, and cumulative distribution models. The user clique model profiles a 
user’s communication groups that naturally occur in their email communication history 
(for example, colleagues, family members, friends, etc). These clique models also 
provide important information to rank order the relative importance of individuals in an 
organization. For example, a person who is a member of many separate cliques indicates 
that that person has many compartmentalized relationships with  sub-groups within the 
organization. 
The Hellinger distance model profiles the distribution of the frequency of 
communication of the user, and the variability of that frequency, between a user and 
his/her correspondents. (Interestingly, the analysis we have performed on the email 
archives of many volunteer email users reveals that email communication behavior 
follows a Zipf distribution, the same distribution that models the naturally occurring 
frequency distribution of words in natural language.) The recipient frequency analysis 
also identifies the relative importance of various email users. By extending the analysis to 
compute the “response rates” to a user’s typical recipients, one can learn the relative rank 
ordering of various people. Those to whom a user responds immediately to are likely 
important people in the organization. A virus would also not know this relative ranking 
and may behave quite differently than the victim user.  
The cumulative distribution model profiles the (daily) rate at which a user sends 
emails to distinct parties in sequential order. Again, a virus would generally not know this 
statistic and violate the user’s typical behavior while propagating itself to new victims. 
These three models are more or less orthogonal to each other and they are combined 
together to form a correlated model that yields very good virus detection performance, 
purely on the basis of behavior, not content analysis.   
We describe a number of experiments using an email archive collected from 15 
volunteers (1 faculty member, 2 research associates and 12 graduate students) 
representing about 8-9% of the Columbia University CS department population of users. 
This archive was acquired late in 2002 by providing a script to capture all of the user’s 
emails covering the time frame of 2001 and 2002 while hashing and compressing the 
body of each message, retaining all other exact information in each email. Approximately 
88,000 email messages and 45,000 attachments were acquired from many volunteers. 
However, for the experiments reported in this paper we selected a subset of the archives 
of 15 specific users who stored all of their emails without any filtering. We conduct 
independent tests of each statistical model introduced and describe the portion of the 
archive used in each such experiment. The experiments we report were performed by 
injecting the sample of the archive with simulated viral emails using the virus’ 
propagation strategies described above. The viruses were not run on a network to avoid 
potential damage (and to avoid violating security policy).  
To measure and compare the detection rate of the combined behavior models, there is 
no baseline to study other than typical COTS virus scanners. We take the point of view 
that a virus scanner will have a 100% True Positive rate and 0% False Positive rate for 
any virus for which a signature exists; but it will also exhibit a 0% TP rate for any “new” 
virus for which a signature has not yet been developed and deployed. It is these “new” 
viruses that cause damage, and that we use under simulation to test the performance of 
EMT. Of particular importance here is the tradeoff between EMT’s TP rate (detecting 
new viruses) and its FP rate, i.e. the percentage of emails deemed viral by EMT but 
which are indeed non-viral. We demonstrate this performance using ROC curves and 
evaluate the “annoyance rate” EMT may exhibit in generating false alarms.  
The results show that EMT’s behavior models are an effective detection system. Its 
best performance in detecting inbound viral propagations over all users is 99% TP and 
0.38% FP, while its best performance for detecting outbound viral propagations from an 
account is 99% TP and 0.9% FP. EMT also exhibited its worst performance for inbound 
viral detection at 70% TP and 0.38% FP (outbound detection is 60% TP and 0.9% FP) if 
the viral propagation is a very slow, stealthy propagation with one viral email delivered 
every 5 days. Thus, fast propagations are easy to detect by observing anomalous email 
flows that are inconsistent with a user's normal email behavior. Slow and stealthy 
propagations are, however, hard to detect.  
 
3. RELATED REASEARCH 
EMT is a data mining and profiling system applied to email data to detect anomalous 
email behavior. Our prior work on the Malicious Email Tracking (MET) system focused 
on modeling the behavior of attachments, and attachment flows in email [3] among 
participating sites either within an enclave or across sites within an enterprise. The 
concept behind MET is to measure the statistics of attachment flows across a mail server 
and to detect a viral propagation as an anomaly (e.g. a “burst” as a “high host saturation”) 
in this attachment flow. Thus, MET is best viewed as an anomaly detector for flows. 
Anomaly detection systems were first proposed by Denning [8] for intrusion 
detection, and later implemented in NIDES [15] to model normal network behavior in 
order to detect deviant behavior that may correspond to an attack against a network 
computer system.  W. Lee et al. describe a framework and system for auditing and data 
mining and feature selection for intrusion detection. This framework consists of 
classification, link analysis and sequence analysis for constructing intrusion detection 
models. [19, 21] 
A variety of other work has appeared in the literature detailing alternative algorithms 
to establish normal profiles, applied to a variety of different audit sources, some specific 
to user commands for masquerade detection [29], others specific to network protocols 
and LAN traffic for detecting denial of service attacks [24, 34] or Trojan execution, or 
application or system call-level data for malware detection [13, 36], to name a few.   
A variety of different modeling approaches have been described in the literature to 
compute baseline profiles. These include probabilistic or statistical distributions over 
temporal data [2, 9, 39], supervised machine learning [11, 20] and unsupervised cluster-
based algorithms [10]. Some approaches consider the correlation of multiple models [11, 
36].   
In general, in the case that an audit source is a stream or temporally ordered data, a 
variety of models may be defined for an audit source and a detector may be computed to 
generate an alarm if a violation is observed based upon volume and velocity statistics. 
Volume statistics represent the amount of data observed per unit of time, while velocity 
statistics model the changes in frequency of the data over time. In our EMT work, for 
example, we compute volume statistics, such as the “number of distinct recipients of 
emails” and the “cumulative number of emails with attachments” sent sequentially. EMT 
also computes the Hellinger distance of the recipient frequency as an example of velocity 
statistics. These two kinds of statistics represent one aspect of a user’s behavior profile 
and are used to detect the abnormal behavior indicative of virus and spam emails.  
We are not aware of any prior work devoted to anomaly detection applied to email 
audit streams other than MET. However, recent work by Forrest [27] and HP [38] and 
social scientists at Columbia University [37] analyze email account connectivity for 
various purposes. In Forrest’s case, they consider email accounts linked in a graph as 
defined by address books to measure network density specifically to provide guidance on 
address book management. They note that viral propagations will spread fast among 
accounts whose address books are deemed “dense” from a graph theoretic point of view. 
The HP and Columbia social science work are similar to our work on cliques. In these 
two pieces of work, the communication density and flow within an organization is 
studied to understand the effectiveness of communication with an organization. In the 
case of the Columbia social science work, they seek to answer the question whether 6 
levels of indirection indeed separate any two people within email communication.   
 
4. EMT MODELING FEATURES 
EMT [32] is useful for report generation and summarization of email archives, as well 
as for detecting email security violations when incorporated with a real-time violation 
detection system, such as the MET system [3]. EMT contains a large collection of 
(statistical) modeling features that may be combined for various detection tasks.  
EMT is implemented in Java providing a GUI implementing an interface to an underlying 
database application. The data can reside in any SQL RDBMS. EMT is also provided 
with a set of parsers written in Java that can read email files from a variety of formats 
(mbox, nsmail, Outlook and Lotus are all supported) and inserts data into the underlying 
database. Each row of this data base is a detailed record of an email from which a variety 
of statistical analyses may be applied.  Most of EMT’s statistical models are computed by 
SQL commands against this database. Thus, EMT has been designed for scalability to 
large email archives, and generality to other communication mediums. A version of EMT 
that analyzes Instant Messaging traffic has also been implemented.  
For this paper, we focus primarily on testing three behavior models computed by EMT to 
detect the onset of viral propagations. We first describe EMT’s analysis of group 
communication behavior. 
 
4.1. GROUP COMMUNICATION MODELS: CLIQUES 
In order to study email flows between groups of users, EMT computes a set of cliques in 
an email archive. We seek to identify clusters or groups of related email accounts that 
participate with each other in common email communications, and then use this 
information to identify unusual email behavior that violates typical group behavior. For 
example, intuitively it is unlikely that a user will send a distinct message to a spouse, a 
boss, “drinking buddies” and church elders all appearing together as recipients of the 
same message (whether delivered in one email, or a series of emails). Of course this is 
possible, but it is rather unlikely. A virus attacking a user’s address book at random 
would surely not know these social relationships and the typical communication pattern 
of the victim.  Hence it would violate the users’ group behavior profile if it propagated 
itself in violation of the user’s social cliques.  
Clique violations may also indicate email security policy violations internal to a secured 
enclave. For example, members of the legal department of a company might be expected 
to exchange many Word attachments containing patent applications. It would be highly 
unusual, and probably unwise, if members of the marketing department, and HR services 
would likewise receive these attachments. We can infer the composition of related groups 
by analyzing normal email flows to compute the naturally occurring cliques, and use the 
learned cliques to alert when emails violate that clique behavior. This may be particularly 
important in intelligence applications that seek to discover violations of 
“compartmentalized” communications.  
Conceptually, two broad types of cliques can be extracted from user email archives: user 
cliques and enclave cliques. In simple terms, user cliques can be computed by analyzing 
the email history of only a single user account, while enclave cliques are social groups 
that emerge as a result of analyzing traffic flows among a group of user accounts within 
an enclave. In this paper, we utilize only User Clique models, leaving the analysis of 
enclave cliques to a future paper.  
4.1.1 User Cliques 
We model the collection of recipients in a single email as a set, and summarize these sets 
and their dynamics. This information is used to detect abnormal emails that violate the 
user’s clique behavior.   
Formally, email communication can be captured by a directed graph ),( EVG  with the 
set of nodes, V , corresponds to individual email accounts and a set of edges, E 
corresponding to email messages.  A directed edge, 12e , exists if 1v sends an email to 2v , 
where 1v  and 2v   are nodes in V . Viewed in this way, cliques are a certain pattern in 
this graph that we characterize and use as norms of communication behavior. (EMT also 
provides an “enclave clique” feature that implements the Bron-Kerbosch clique finding 
algorithm to compute all connected components in this graph.) 
Aside from the graphical view, the user clique model is best described in terms of item 
sets. An item set is a set of items associated with a transaction, such as a single purchase 
at a supermarket. The goal of analyzing item sets is to extract useful association rules of 
how items appear together. This problem has been studied in the data mining and 
database community and is of great commercial interest for its wide range of applications 
and potential predictive value that can be derived [1].  
In the context of mining email, an email can be viewed as a transaction that involves 
multiple accounts, including a sender (in the FROM field) and recipient(s) in the (TO, CC 
and, BCC fields). If we discover the rules governing the co-appearance of these addresses, 
we could then use these rules to detect emails that violate these patterns. Suspicious 
emails may then be examined further by other models to confirm or deny that they are 
malicious. 
 
Figure 2. Three item sets from account U: {A,B,C}, {B,C,D,E} and {D,E}.  
The first two sets share two nodes and the last set is subsumed by the second set. 
The resulting user cliques are {A,B,C} and {B,C,D,E}. 
The recipient list of a single email can be viewed as a clique associated with the FROM 
account. However, using this set (or item set) directly is problematic for two reasons. 
First, a single user account would contain a large number of such sets and enumerating 
them for real-time reporting or detection tasks would be undesirable. Second, some of 
these sets are duplicates or subsets of one another and it would be difficult to use them 
directly for any purpose. For these reasons, we define a user clique as a set of recipients 
that cannot be subsumed by another set. Thus, we compute the most frequent email item 
sets that are not subsumed by another larger item set. Naturally, a single user will have a 
relatively small number of user cliques. As an example, suppose a user has in his/her 
sent-folder four emails with the following recipient lists: {A, B, C}, {A, B, C}, {A, B}, 
and {A, B, D}.  The user cliques belonging to this user would be {A, B, C} and {A, B, 
D}.  Note that duplicate user cliques are removed, as it does not contribute useful 
information. 
Once these sets are derived off-line by analyzing a user’s “profile” period, we inspect 
each email sent from the user’s account in a subsequent “test” period of time to determine 
if there is a clique violation – i.e. the recipient list is inconsistent with the user’s cliques. 
An email sent from a user is regarded as inconsistent with the user’s cliques if its 
recipient list is not a subset of any user cliques belonging to that user. 
The usefulness of this model depends not only on how quickly new groups of recipients 
form over time but also on how it is combined with other models. Installing a monitoring 
tool using this model on a new account or an account that is constantly communicating 
with new groups may cause too many false alarms and thus render the model useless. 
However, this very behavior is indicative of user email usage patterns and thus can be 
turned into a feature that characterizes user behavior.   
Although the dynamics of clique formation [7] (and expiration) is implemented in EMT, 
for the present paper we shall ignore the dynamics of clique formation to explore the 
utility of the base user clique model. Computing the set of “static cliques” is sufficiently 
informative for the purpose at hand; this model provides useful evidence of a viral 
propagation launched from a user’s account.  
Notice that if a user ever sends a single broadcast email to everyone in their address book, 
there would be only one user clique remaining in the model for that user. This would 
render the model almost useless for the user in question for the virus detection task 
because no clique violation is possible as long as a user does not communicate with 
someone new. In practice, however, this scenario is highly unlikely to happen. We 
illustrate this point by examining the communication patterns of 15 users in our database. 
We show that most of the time, a user will send a single email to less than 10% of the 
people in their address book. For an account with a small address book, a single email 
could cover 20%, 30% or an even higher percentage of the address book. As we can see 
from Table 2, the probability of an email covering a given range of percentages of an 
address book decreases quickly as the percentage range increases.  In fact, none of the 15 
users ever sent a broadcast email to everyone in his/her address book. 
Table 2. Percentages of an address book covered by a single email;  

























1 324 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1308 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 38 0.46 0.49 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 144 0.96 0.01 0.01 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 26 0 0.74 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0 
6 105 0.95 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 64 0.98 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 92 0.95 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 43 0.70 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 
10 24 0.54 0.12 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 
11 75 0.91 0.09 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1231 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 231 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 368 1.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 568 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Avg 291 0.83 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0 0 
Although a single user might produce a broadcast message to all addresses in their 
address book (eg., when changing contact information) intuitively, and as the data shows 
in Table 2, such events are so rare that EMT ought to detect these cases as clique 
violations. This is accomplished by modeling the frequency of clique communications.  
Even if the model falsely labels such an event as a viral propagation, the annoyance 
factor associated with this rare event can be comfortably ignored and does not invalidate 
the core thesis that viruses will violate a user’s clique behavior, as we demonstrate 
experimentally in the next section.  For users who may broadcast every one of their email 
messages to all addresses in their address book, the clique model may have little value.  
4.1.2. Test of Simulated Viruses 
Here we evaluate the utility of user clique violations (independent of other modeling 
techniques) for viral propagation detection. We simulate viruses by inserting “dummy” 
emails into an email archive following a propagation strategy that has been observed 
from numerous real viruses seen in the wild. The first 80% of emails sent from each 
account is deemed the profile period used for deriving user cliques associated with that 
account. The remaining 20% of the emails are used during the testing phase where the 
dummy emails simulating the propagation are inserted.  
For this simulation, it is not critical exactly when and how often viral emails are sent out. 
That is, we ignore the propagation rate entirely; determining whether or not a recipient 
set violates existing user cliques is independent of the timing of the email in question. 
However, during the simulation/test phase, user cliques are updated on a daily basis and 
the timing of email is affected slightly. Such effects are still more or less negligible, as 
having viral emails that are sent later in time is tantamount to having a longer training 
phase and a shorter test phase. 
In terms of modeling attack strategies, we tested the effectiveness of the user clique 
violation model against various sizes of a viral email recipient list. For illustrative 
purposes, we assume that a virus would fetch email addresses from the address book of 
an infected user to propagate itself. In reality, email addresses could be obtained via 
others means, such as scanning the inbox, sent folder and email archives. Without loss of 
generality, the simulation has the virus propagating itself to recipients chosen at random. 
However, the usefulness of user-clique violation detection in practice depends on how a 
virus obtains the target email addresses. For example, a virus obtaining addresses from an 
inbox and replying to respective senders and everyone else in the message may not be 
detected easily, depending upon how compatible they are with existing user cliques. (This 
implies that the virus would imitate or mimic the user’s behavior; avoiding this mimicry 
attack involves other security mechanisms and is the subject of ongoing work to be 
reported in a future paper.) 
Herein lies the reason for False Positives produced by this model. The other models we 
explore below mitigate these mistakes by modeling the user’s email frequency 
distribution. 
As we can see from the ROC curve in Figure 3, the false positive rate is invariant with 
respect to the size of the recipient list. This is expected, as this rate is defined as the 
number of false positives over the number of normal emails, and both of these quantities 
do not vary with respect to how viral emails are sent under our simulation setting. It is 
interesting to note that the true positive detection increases dramatically as the size of the 
recipient lists in a viral email grows from 1 to 2 to 3 and then approaches 100% gradually 
as the list size further increases.  This result is intuitive; we should not expect that there 
would be many user clique violations if a virus sends an email to only one recipient at a 
time. The fact that this number is not 0, as one might have thought, deserves some 
mention. This could happen because certain email addresses appear in an address book 
before any email is sent to them.   
 
Figure 3. Test of simulated viruses. 
 Parameter: Varying number of email recipients per attack email. 
While a virus may try to thwart our detection effort by sending itself to one address at a 
time, it will inevitably have to send many separate emails to achieve the same 
propagation speed. In doing so, it is likely a different level of threshold would be 
triggered by another model that is tuned to the user’s outbound email frequency. Thus, 
we combine the user clique detection model with other methods of detection, such as 
Hellinger Distance described in the next section, to mitigate this error.  
Alternatively, as demonstrated below - the Backward/Forward Scanning algorithm - we 
may delay email transmission to gather evidence of clique violations among a sequential 
set of similar or equivalent emails indicative of a propagation. The TP and FP detection 
rates dramatically improve under this strategy as well. 
 
4.2. NON-STATIONARY USER PROFILES 
Most email accounts follow certain trends, which can be modeled by an underlying 
distribution. As a practical example, many people will typically email a few addresses 
very frequently, while emailing many others infrequently. Day to day interactions with a 
limited number of peers usually results in some predefined groups of emails being sent. 
Other contacts communicated to on a less than daily basis have a more infrequent email 
exchange behavior. These patterns can be learned through an analysis of a user’s email 
archive over a set of sequential emails. For some users, 500 emails may occur over 
months, for others over days. The duration of these email transmissions is not material for 
the profile we now consider.   
Almost every user of an email system develops a unique pattern of email emission to a 
specific list of recipients, each having their own frequency of occurrence (with respect to 
the number of emails). Modeling every user's idiosyncrasies enables the system to detect 
malicious or anomalous activity in the account. This is similar to what happens in credit 
card fraud detection, where current behavior violates some past behavior patterns. 
It is important to note that a user’s email pattern is not static. The frequency distribution 
computed by EMT accommodates the user’s change in frequency that may occur during 
the profile period, whether the user goes on vacation, is out sick, or is in a flurry of 
activity to make a deadline for submission. These changes are measured and modeled as 
we describe next.  
4.2.1. Profile of a user 
We analyze the user account's activity in terms of recipient frequency. Figure 4 displays 
the frequency at which the user sends emails to all the recipients communicated to in the 
past. Each point on the x-axis represents one recipient and the corresponding height of 
the bar measures the frequency of emails sent to this recipient as a percentage. (The 
display is an actual distribution from a volunteer email account. All others have been 
found to follow the same type of distribution.)  
This bar chart is sorted in decreasing order, and usually appears as a nice convex curve 
with a strong skew; a long low tail on the right side, and a very thin spike at the start on 
the left side. This frequency bar chart can be modeled with either a Zipf distribution, or a 
DGX distribution (Discrete Gaussian Exponential distribution), which is a generalized 
version of the Zipf distribution. This family of distributions characterize some specific 
human behavioral patterns, such as word frequencies in written texts, or URL frequencies 
in Internet browsing [4].  In brief, its main trait is that few objects receive a large part of 
the flow, while many objects receive a very small part of the flow. 
 
 
Figure 4. Recipient Frequency Distribution. Notice it follows a Zipf-like distribution. 
The rank-frequency version of Zipf's law states that )(rf ∝ r/1 , where )(rf  is the 
occurrence frequency versus the rank r, in logarithmic-logarithmic scales.  The 
generalized Zipf distribution is defined as )(rf ∝ θ)/1( r , where the log-log plot can be 
linear with any slope. Our tests indicate that the log-log plots are concave, and thus 
require the usage of the DGX distribution for a better fit [4]. 
We also analyze the number of distinct recipients and attachments. However, we use 
“records” instead of emails. For example, if a user sends one email, to B, and carbon 
copies that email to C, D and E, these are four records in the database recording these 
communication events. Because a virus may send to several victims via one email (by 
CC’ing to everyone), or several emails (one by one), by using “records” we consider both 
cases within the model. 
Figure 5 contains several curves that visualize the variability of the user's emission of 
emails. The statistics calculated are the number of distinct recipients and the number of 
messages with attachments. The first type of curve uses a rolling window of 50 (or 20) 
records to calculate the number of distinct recipients. These values are ordered by time. 
For example, in this data this user has 750 records, and all of them are sorted by time. At 
the location 200 in the chart, the value of the curve, with the rolling window size of 50, is 
10 (see the highest plot). This means that in the past 50 records there are 10 different 
recipients of the user’s outbound email. What this analysis means is that the higher this 
plot approaches 50, the wider the range of recipients the selected user sends emails to 
over time. (The user is thus conducting many conversations with many people.) On the 
other hand, if the metric is low, it means that the user predominantly sends messages to a 
small group of people. 
 
Figure 5. Plots showing variability of recipients and attachments for one account. 
We also plot a curve (the middle dashed line) using 20 as the window size instead of 50. 
This metric has a faster reaction to anomalous behavior, while the previous one using 
blocks of 50 shows the longer-term behavior. The short-term profile can be used as the 
first level of alert, the longer-term one acting to confirm any detected anomalous 
frequency change.  
Another type of curve is the number of messages with attachment(s), per block of 50 
records (the lowest dashed line). It shows the average ratio of emails with attachments 
versus emails without attachments, and any sudden spike of emails sent with attachments 
will be detected on the plot as a significant spike. The profile displays a fingerprint of a 
specific user's email frequency behavior. The most common malicious intrusion can be 
detected very fast by the metrics. For instance, a Melissa-type virus would be detected 
since the curves will increase rapidly to 50, 20 and 50, respectively. 
 
4.2.2. Chi Square Test of Recipient Frequency 
We test the hypothesis that the recipient frequencies are identical over two different time 
frames by a Chi Square test. Obviously, recipient frequencies are not constant over a long 
time horizon, as users will add new recipients and drop old ones. It can be informative for 
behavioral modeling though, to analyze the variability of frequencies over two near time 
frames. 
We compare two time periods of activity for the same user. The idea is to treat the first 
period as the true distribution corresponding to the user under normal behavior, while the 
second time period is used to evaluate whether or not the user’s frequencies have changed, 
providing evidence that perhaps a malicious activity is taking place. Generally, we 
operate under the usual 1/5 - 4/5 ratio between testing and training sets. For example, we 
use 1000 records as a training-testing set, 200 recent records are selected as the testing 
range, while the previous 800 are the training range. Note that the “testing range” 
represents a user’s new incoming or outgoing emails, and the “training range” represents 
the previous normal behavior used to generate the profile. 
Assuming that the observed frequencies corresponding to the first, longer time frame 
window are the true underlying frequencies, the Chi Square statistic enables us to 
evaluate how likely the observed frequencies from the second time frame are drawn from 









where )(iX is the number of observations for recipient i  in the testing range, )(ip is 
the true frequency calculated from the training range, n is the number of observations in 
the testing range, and k is the number of recipients during the training period. There are 
1−k  degrees of freedom.  
The p-value represents the probability that the frequencies in both time frames come from 
the same distribution. In order to get an idea of the variability of the frequencies under 
real conditions, we used a sample of 37,556 records from 8 users. We ran two batches of 
calculations. First, we used a training period size of 400 records and a testing period size 
of 100 records; for each user, we started at the first record, calculated the p-value, then 
shifted the two windows by steps of 10 records until the end of the log was reached, each 
time calculating the p-value. Secondly, we reproduced the same experiment, but with a 
training period size of 800 records, and a testing period size of 200 records.  We thus 
collected a total of 7,947 p-values, and the histogram is shown in Figure 6. 
 Figure 6. P-value Plot. 
Under the hypothesis that the frequencies are constant, the histogram is expected to be a 
flat line. On the contrary, this histogram is characterized by a very large concentration of 
p-values between 0 and 5%, and a large (but less large) concentration between 95 and 
100%, while p-values in the range of 5 to 95% are under-represented. Intuitively, most of 
the time, frequencies change significantly (in a statistical sense) between two consecutive 
time frames; this is why 60% of the p-values are below 5% (as a low p-value indicates a 
very high chance that the frequencies have changed between two time frames). Email 
users tend to modify their recipient frequencies quite often (at least the 8 volunteers). On 
the other hand, there are non-negligible times when those frequencies stay very stable (as 
13% of the p-values are above 95%, indicating strong stability). As the frequencies have 
been found to be so variable under normal circumstances, the Chi Square test itself could 
not be used to reliably detect an abnormal email behavior. Instead we utilize the 
Hellinger Distance metric, a related metric that evaluates changes in frequency over two 
frequency distributions.   
  
4.2.3. Hellinger Distance 
Our first tests using the Chi-square statistic revealed that the frequencies cannot be 
assumed to be constant between two consecutive time frames for a given user. We 
postulate, though, that what is specific to every user is how variable their frequency 
changes are over time. We model this user behavior by calculating a measure between 
two frequency tables.  We use the Hellinger Distance for this purpose, as this metric is 










where []pf  is the array of normalized frequencies for the training set (profiling period), 
[]tf for the testing set, n is the total number of distinct recipients/senders observed 
during both periods. We define the Hellinger testing window size as the range of emails 
that are tested, while the training range size is a multiple of that, usually 4. The arrays of 
frequencies is defined as,  
ppp wsiNif /)(][ = , and  ttt wsiNif /)(][ = , 
where wsp is the Hellinger training window size, wst  is the Hellinger testing window size, 
piN )(  and tiN )(  are the number of times that the current recipient (in the case for 
outbound traffic), or sender (for inbound traffic) of the emails appears in the range wsp 
and wst, for the profiling period p and testing period t, respectively, of emails being 
evaluated. This is computed for both inbound and outbound email traffic. Figure 7 
displays an example for a user from our group of volunteers who provided their email 
archive. 
 
Figure 7. The Hellinger distance plot of an email user. 
The Hellinger distance plot shows the distance between training and testing sets plotted 
over the entire email history of the user. For example, if a user has 2500 outbound 
records and the window size is 100, the plots starts at the 500th record, and measures the 
distance between the frequencies corresponding to the first 400 records, versus the emails 
corresponding to the next 100 records; these two windows, of 400 (training) and 100 
(testing) records, respectively, are then rolled forward over the entire email history of the 
user, by steps of one record. At each step, a Hellinger distance is calculated between the 
given training window of 400 records, and the corresponding testing window of 100 
records. 
What this plot tells us is that when a burst in email activity occurs, the recipient 
frequencies have been changing significantly. This statistic provides evidence of either a 




4.2.4. Evaluation techniques using simulated viruses and threshold settings 
As real email data with real embedded viral emails are very difficult to obtain [29] (and 
dangerous and possibly illegal to generate), we injected “dummy” viruses into a real 
email log file as described above. A set of parameters introduces randomness in the 
process, in order to mimic real conditions and explore boundary conditions: the time at 
which the virus starts, the number of corrupted emails sent by the virus and its 
propagation rate.  
For testing purposes, all the recipients of such “dummy” corrupted records are picked 
randomly from the address list of a selected user. In reality, where addresses are obtained 
and how they are combined can be a crucial issue for a virus to successfully propagate 
itself without being detected. The simulated recipient list of the virus can be set to be all 
distinct addresses, as most viruses seem to do. But not all viruses would send an email 
only once to each target recipient account. In our simulation, each “dummy” record 
contains one attachment, but no information about the attachment is provided or used.  
(Recall, our focus here is to demonstrate the value of behavior models, as an adjunct to 
content-based analyses.) For our purposes, we do not need to know the content of the 
message, its size, and the size and content of the attachments. So, these techniques may 
be general enough that they encompass polymorphic viruses as well (where content 
analysis or scanners may fail).   
The experiments use a combination of three plots, Hellinger Distance, “number of 
distinct recipients”, and the “number of attachments”. Figure 8 displays plots detailing 
the profile of one user in our archive.  Our intuition is that when a virus is executed, its 
propagation will cause each plot to increase, i.e. it will not “simulate” the user’s real 
frequency distribution. We use a threshold logic to detect “abnormal” growth of these 
plots.   
 
Figure 8. Three evaluation models.  
Solid lines are calculated values, dashed lines are thresholds.  
We use two types of thresholds to determine when a “burst” occurs, a threshold 
proportional to the standard deviation of the plots, and a threshold based upon the 
changing “trend” revealed by the Hellinger Distance, both conditioned on a window size 
of prior plotted values. An email is deemed viral if any model deems it to be viral 
according to the threshold settings.  
We believe it may be necessary to calibrate the threshold settings on a per user basis. For 
this study, we did not implement specific “user calibration”; rather we aim to establish a 
baseline of performance over all users to reveal whether user specific thresholds might be 
needed. 
The first threshold is the value of the plot at some point adjusting it by a factor 
proportional to the standard deviation of the average value of the plot calculated from the 
previous n values of the plot. Thus, the threshold is dynamic, essentially proportional to 
one standard deviation from the mean for the recent user’s behavior. The threshold value 
is defined as  )),(][(][ njjstjViT −∗+= α  where ][iT  is the threshold value at  
location i,  ][ jV is the value of the plots at location j, α is a constant that is set to 0.1, the 
function st(a, b) returns the standard deviation in the range ],[ ba , n is the window size, 
and j = i – shift. We need a shift value to calculate the threshold using the prior range of 
data. Without the shift value, the threshold would be always higher than the original value 
since ][iT  is always greater than ][iV .  
The second threshold was developed by observing the trends of the three plotted statistics.  
When both the “number of distinct recipients” and the “number of attachments” plots 
grow (the values increase), and when the slope of the “Hellinger Distance” model grows, 
this range of emails is marked as suspicious. This means that the “slope” acts as a 
threshold for the Hellinger Distance model, but is used only when both plots (number of 
recipients and number of emails with attachments) exceed their threshold. Hellinger 
Distance thus serves as a “confirmation” of the other two models.  
In Figure 8, the test “dummy” emails simulating viral emails are injected at location 300. 
In the two rightmost curves we see a “burst”. However, in the Hellinger Distance plot on 
the left, it’s not confirmed as a “burst” since in this period of time the user’s changing 
behavior is not abnormal. Recall the Hellinger function. The Hellinger distance expresses 
the change in the user’s behavior.  There are four trends that the Hellinger metric may 
reveal as shown in Table 3. The columns are the user behavior indicating the number of 
recipients that the user usually sends to. 
 
Table 3. User behavior and Hellinger Distance. 
 
The curves graphically represent different user behaviors during periods of time when 
viral emails may appear. In region A, the user is changing his/her behavior rapidly, and a 
viral propagation with many recipients would be more difficult to detect. These would be 
detected towards the end of the period when the slope of the Hellinger plot changes to 
zero. In region B, when the user’s behavior is stable, viral propagations are more 
noticeable. In region D, a stable user behavior provides the means of detecting a viral 
propagation more easily. However, in region C, nothing can be found easily. A stable 
user who sends to lots of different recipients is the best victim of a virus. This situation 
means the user’s normal behavior is akin to a virus propagation! He or she always sends 
emails to all the people he or she knows. 
 
 4.2.5. Results of Hellinger Test on Simulated Viruses 
The dataset used for this independent test is an archive of 15 users, totaling 20,301 emails. 
The parameters that were randomly generated at each simulation were the time of the 
injected viral emails and the list of recipients (taken from the address list of each selected 
user). The parameters that were controlled were the propagation rate, the number of 
corrupted records sent, and the window size (of the Hellinger distance metric). In total, 
about 500,000 simulations were performed.  
As expected, a slower propagation rate (longer inter-departure time) makes detection 
harder. Each email record corresponding to a virus email inserted into the archive 
becomes less “noticeable” among the entire email flow. As can be seen in Figure 9, the 
performance gets worse when the inter-departure time increases; that is to say slow and 
stealthy propagations are hard to detect. 
 Figure 9. Varying inter-departure time. 
The Hellinger window size is the most important parameter. We plot the TP rate as a 
function of window size in Figure 10 to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to this 
parameter. In this test, the inter-departure time is 30 minutes. The performance is best 
when the window size is the same as the number of dummy records inserted into the 
archive. The reason is that, for example, when the window size is 50 and there are 20 
injected viral records (the number of injected viral records is less than the window size), 
these records do not occupy a very significant portion of the 50 records. The model may 
not determine that they are suspicious. On the other hand, if there are 100 injected 
records and the first 50 are not detected, these 50 dummy records will be treated as 
normal records in the next round of Hellinger training. As a consequence, the system will 
likely model the first 50 as normal and not be able to detect any abnormality. (This is a 
consequence of any “unsupervised” learning based approach. Without supervised or 
cleaned training data, whatever may be present in the training data, such as viral emails,  
could be considered normal and hence becomes part of the normal model.)  
 
Figure 10. Increasing Hellinger window-size produces lower detection rates. 
In summary, we achieved very reasonable results with the Hellinger distance model. 
However, there are still three problems. First, we assumed that we had enough normal 
records before and after the inserted viral emails to develop sufficient statistics modeling 
the user and detecting the propagation. We also assume in this simulation that we can 
analyze all the records (both dummy and normal) at the same time, which is not practical. 
We cannot block a user’s email for a long time, for instance, a few hours. However, we 
may store a record of the emails and detect the propagation after the fact, but perhaps still 
in sufficient time to forewarn the recipients that they likely have received a viral email in 
their inbox from the recently detected infected victim. 
Second, it’s difficult to optimize the Hellinger window size, as it depends on the viral 
strategy used. In practice, we can overcome this by blocking all outgoing emails once we 
detect a virus. The question is then how can we detect the first instance of the virus 
propagation?   
Third, the false positive rate is about 15%, which cannot be reduced in this model easily. 
Thus, to achieve a better detector, this method has to be used in combination with other 
models. The first two issues will be addressed in the next section. 
 
4.3. COMBINING USER CLIQUE AND HELLINGER DISTANCE 
The Hellinger distance model is the result of analyzing the aggregate behavior of a 
sequence of emails. As such, it would not react immediately when a viral email 
appears. Similarly, it would keep setting off alarms for a short while after a batch of viral 
emails has already been sent out. On the other hand, the user cliques model could detect a 
suspicious viral email upon its first appearance. It is worth mentioning that every time an 
email with a new address appears in the user’s inbox, the user clique model will treat it as 
a violation. In short, Hellinger analyzes the trend of users’ behavior by analyzing a buffer 
of email records of their recent behavior, while the user clique method is oriented 
towards detection of individual viral emails at that moment in time when they are sent or 
received. Ideally, combining these models may achieve better overall detection 
performance. 
4.3.1 Backward/Forward Scanning algorithm 
The intuitive reasoning here is quite simple. When sufficient evidence for a viral 
propagation has been detected, i.e. an email has an alert generated by both models (clique 
violation and a substantial change in the user’s email emission) it is highly likely that 
prior and subsequent emails will be part of the virus propagation. We seek to detect these 
other emails by searching a set of buffered emails (or their record of emission) inspecting 
the model outputs for each. We search prior emails for evidence of being part of the onset 
of a viral propagation. This evidence is simply whether any one of the EMT models has 
deemed it a violation. We also search forward in time and test emails until we find an 
email that violated no model. Intuitively, therefore, the propagation has terminated, or the 
user has sent legitimate emails during the propagation. We apply this technique for both 
inbound traffic (the optimal case to prevent infection) and the outbound case when an 
infection has succeeded but we wish to limit the viral spread as quickly as possible.  
The most straightforward method to combine the user clique and Hellinger Distance 
models is to “intersect” their alert outputs. Depending upon the threshold settings, a close 
examination shows that they have different distributions of false positives. For example, 
the user clique model may generate false positives on email number 1, 3 and 5, while 
Hellinger may generate false positives on email number 2, 4 and 6. If we take the 
intersection, we can eliminate most false positives. However, a lower false positive rate 
may be achieved at the expense of a lower TP detection rate. 
We propose an alternative strategy we call the Backward/Forward Scanning algorithm. 
Emails are assumed to be buffered before they are actually sent out or, as we mentioned, 
a record of all sent emails are kept for analysis, including instances of the virus that have 
escaped without early detection. These records however inform as to where those viral 
emails were sent so new victims may be warned. This is a key feature introduced in the 
MET system.  
Such rate limiting or buffering of email could be hidden and unbeknownst to the user. 
Email may be viewed as a store and forward technology (at least one hop through the 
server). However, an egress “store for a while, then forward” strategy for email delivery 
has a practical advantage. As far as the user is concerned, the email is sent from client to 
server and is delivered by the underlying communication system at some arbitrary future 
time. Thus, the strategy of buffering and holding emails for some period of time allows 
sufficient statistics to be computed by the models and also benefits mitigation strategies 
to quarantine viral emails before their delivery, limiting exposure to the enterprise or 
enclave.  
Alternatively, a record of the recently delivered emails may also benefit early detection 
and mitigation strategies. When the system sees an alert triggered by both the Hellinger 
Distance model and the user clique model, it will examine all adjacent emails more 
closely, those preceding it and those newly sent by the client. Namely, it will trace (scan) 
all buffered emails forward and backward (or their record of delivery), starting from the 
common trigger. The trace attempts to find all sequential emails that are deemed 
suspicious by the user clique model and will end once a harmless email, as viewed by 
user cliques, is encountered.  The system then marks all those emails found along the 
trace as suspicious.  
Figure 11 is a graphical view of this Backward/Forward Scanning algorithm. Each email 
in the sequence is denoted by “x” or “o”, depending on whether or not there is an alert 
associated with it. In this example, we have 18 emails, labeled from #1 to #18. These 
emails are buffered (stored) and analyzed by both models. The alerts generated by the 
user clique model are in the first row. The suspicious emails with alerts are #4 to #11, 
#16 and #17. The alerts generated by the Hellinger Distance model are in the second row, 
and the suspicious emails are #7, #8, #9, #13 and #14. 
 
Figure 11. Depiction of the backward/forward scanning algorithm. 
The algorithm proceeds as follows. In the first step, we find the first alert triggered by 
both models. In this case email #7 is detected. We then inspect the model outputs for each 
of the adjacent emails prior to #7 and find #4, #5 and #6 have model outputs that 
triggered alerts by the user clique model, but not by the Hellinger Distance model. We 
thus generate alerts for each of these as the first set of outputs by this buffer scanning 
method.  
In the second step, we scan forward, those emails occurring after #7. Here we find emails 
#8 and #9 have alerts triggered by both models, but #10 does not.  We check the model 
outputs for those immediately following emails occurring after #10 for which one model 
has generated an alert. Stepping forward, we capture #10 and #11, but terminate at email 
#12, which has generated no alerts for either model. Finally, we clear all the alerts that 
are not triggered by both models after # 11 deeming these as False Positives. We next 
report results using this strategy. 
 
4.3.2 Tests of simulated virus propagations 
The dataset for this independent test, both inbound and outbound emails includes 53,163 
emails from 15 users, and 8% of these emails contain attachments.  
We treat the first 80% of the email data as each user’s normal behavior (training data) 
and inject a batch of “dummy records” into the last 20% (testing data). We test 100 times 
for each user, generate the dummy emails at a random location (time), and take the 
average of the results over all runs for the three different users. The summary results of 
this test are displayed in the ROC curves depicted in Figure 14. (Space limitation does 
not permit the inclusion of all source data generating these plots.)  Naturally, only emails 
with attachments are tested by the EMT models since only these can contain viruses. 
Thus, for clarity, the TP rate is the percentage of dummy emails deemed correctly to be 
viral, and the FP rate is the percentage of “normal” user emails with attachments that are 
mislabeled by EMT as viral.  
During the test phase, we train and test the email data on a daily basis. For example, on 
the first day of the eleventh month, we put all the data (on that day) into the buffer. Then 
we use the training data to test whether the emails are suspicious depicting abnormal 
behaviors. We then move forward on a day by day basis for testing. After an individual 
test day, we assume the user will review and confirm the normal and viral data. Then, we 
will update the database, which is training data (i.e. add the normal emails for next daily 
test and drop viral emails). 
The parameters that are controlled are the propagation rate and the number of recipients 
in a single dummy email. The first parameter is one of the most important issues in the 
Hellinger simulation . The second parameter is more pertinent to user cliques. Having 
more recipients in a single email makes it easier for the user clique model to detect a 
violation. Both inbound and outbound emails are tested. However, we divide the results, 
because a user’s behavior of inbound and outbound emails may be different. 
Another important issue is the Hellinger window size. Since it is impossible a priori to 
choose a single and perfect Hellinger window size in the general case for all users, we 
change it by evaluating the size of data (records) each day for each user. The window size 
is meaningless if it is too small or too large. If it’s too small, each email has too much of 
an influence on the statistics and each email may look like a virus. If it’s too large, the 
training data would not be enough to establish sufficient statistics and a small number of 
virus emails could easily go undetected. In our simulation, we set the window size to the 
average number of daily emails sent by each user, bounded below by 20 and above by 
100. Optimally calibrating this parameter for each user is the subject of ongoing research.  
We first test and measure the outbound email from a user account to detect the onset of a 
viral propagation from an early victim. Varying the number of recipients in a single virus 
email yields a very interesting result. The upper-left plot of Figure 14 displays the 
average of the results. The TP rate increases with the size of the recipient list in a 
simulated viral email rapidly approaching 100%. This means a virus email is easy to 
detect if it propagates itself to many email addresses (for example, 9) and sends them in a 
single email or at the same time. We found that with just three recipients in a single email, 
the average TP rate is about 90%. The reason FP hovers around 8% and is almost 
invariant with respect to virus strategy is rooted in the definition of FP, the number of 
false positives divided by the total number of non-viral emails with attachments. Only the 
numerator depends on the properties of the emails being tested by the models. In addition, 
the alarm is triggered due to clique violations and Hellinger violation. The same false 
alerts are always triggered, regardless of the viral propagation strategy. We find that each 
user model exhibits a different TP rate and FP rate.   
The first test reveals encouraging results. However, this is because we set a high 
propagation rate in our simulated “dummy” emails. The inter-departure time used is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 10 minutes in this test. The next test varies this 
propagation rate. 
In this independent test, the number of recipients in a single email is set to 4.  The 
detection rate gets worse when the inter-departure time increases (the upper-right plot of 
Figure 14, i.e. the virus is stealthily propagating at a very slow rate). If this happens in the 
real world, once we detect the first virus (with long inter-departure time), we would likely 
have enough time to mitigate its effects, since it propagates slowly. Thus, the issue here 
again is how best to detect the first virus in a new propagation.   
We next consider the results achieved by EMT for inbound email; the optimal case to 
prevent viral propagations from entering an enclave or attacking a victim in the first place. 
The parameters for the inbound test of EMT are the same as the outbound test. The 
results are displayed in the lower plots of Figure 14. 
Here we aim to detect an inbound email with an attachment from a sender that is unusual. 
Notice, in the lower-left plot of Figure 14 inbound emails with a single recipient have a 
very low TP rate. For the user data on hand, it is NOT unusual that inbound emails have 
only one recipient. When the number of recipients increases, and clique violations appear, 
the detection rate naturally grows, but with a fairly stable FP rate. Notice too in the 
lower-right plot of Figure 14 that the rate of receipt of viral emails affects detection 
performance. Fast arrival times are easy to detect inbound viral propagations. Slow rates 
decrease performance markedly. We may mitigate these FP rates in the same fashion as 
outbound traffic. By inspecting sequences of inbound emails destined to a user over a 
period of time, we increase the likelihood of detecting the inbound viral traffic. Moreover, 
because each user may a distinct behavior from other users and a user’s behavior may 
change rapidly over time, we can also measure the dynamic activity of users by using 
statistics capturing cyclic interaction patterns [7] to achieve better performance. 
 
 
Figure 12. Average results of all tests.  
Upper Left: Outbound test, Lower Left: Inbound; both varying number of ecipients 
in each email. Upper Right: Outbound, Lower Right, Inbound;  
varying inter-departure time in minutes. 
 
4.4. IMPROVING THE DETECTION OF CHANGES IN FREQUENCY 
The Hellinger distance model performs fairly well with an impressive TP rate. However, 
the FP rate may render the approach too frustrating for users who are accustomed to 
seeing no false alarms generated by their virus scanners. Combining the Hellinger model 
with the clique violation model improved the results, yet the false positives remain too 
high. Here we explore the addition of a third model, the cumulative distribution of 
emitted emails by a user in a sequence of emails. Here, we restrict the statistic to those 
emails with attachments that appear in the user’s archive.  
 
4.4.1 Cumulative attachment distribution  
Suppose we have a period over T days, from day 1, 2,…, T, and let Ni be the number of 
emails with attachments on day i, and Ui be the cumulative number of emails with 









The idea here is that a user will emit emails with attachments at a relatively low and 
constant (human-oriented) daily rate. If we take a long period of time (for example, three 
months), the slope may be a positive constant. The introduction of a viral propagation 
would manifest as a significant discontinuity in this plot. Because in the real email data in 
our database, most users don’t send emails with attachments each day, we compute the 
slope of several days (testing days), and test the slope with a previous longer period (the 
longer term profiling training days). 
Assume we have t testing days from day i to day i+t, and r training days from day j to 
day j+r. We detect this discontinuity of the user emission rate behavior over t days by 
comparing the slopes of the cumulative distribution over r days. 
rUUtUU jrjiti /)(/)( −>−∗ ++α  
where α  is the tolerance parameter for the change of the slope. The threshold α  is set 
by the following intuition. Assume a user’s normal behavior of sending emails with 
attachments will not be more than on standard deviation above the mean of the prior d 
days, i.e. let Vi = Ui + standard deviation in previous d days and Vi is the number of 
emails with attachment of the user’s normal trend on day i. For example, if on average, a 
user sends one email with an attachment every day, we expect that the user will send one 
with perhaps a few more email(s) with attachments on the next day, denoted Vi. Then, to 
compute the boundary of normal behavior, we compute: 
)/)/(()/)(( dUUdUV diidii −− −−=α  
After computing this ratio for each users’ email in our database, α  ranged between 1.1 
and 1.5. Using this formula, d can be set to any value of course. In the experiments 
reported here, d is set to 5 and α  is set to 1.2, which we shall see are acceptable values. 
If the calculated value of the data violates the inequality in our daily testing (day i+t), we 
say emails on this day are suspicious. Then we use this fact to confirm the alerts that may 
have been generated by the Hellinger and Clique models. If either of them has issued 
alerts on day i+t, we verify these alerts.  
In Figure 15, the blue (upper) lines are the cumulative number of emails plotted day by 
day, and the red (lower) lines are likewise the cumulative number of emails with 
attachments (a strict subset of all emails emitted by the user). The left plot is a user’s 
normal email cumulative distribution. In the right plot, after we add some dummy 
simulated viral emails; the red line displays an apparent discontinuity or a burst identified 
by the green circled area. 
 
Figure 15. Cumulative distribution analysis of emails with attachments. 
 
4.4.2 Combing all three models 
Here we test the application of the three combined models, Hellinger distance, violations 
of the cumulative distribution, and clique violations using the same Backward/Forward 
scanning algorithm described earlier. The dataset for this test is the same data used in the 
previous tests which includes 53,163 emails from 15 users; approximately 8% of these 
emails contain attachments. The detailed performance results are provided in the average 
ROC plots displayed in Figure 16.  The false positive rate has now substantially dropped 
down to 0.9%. (Note, the two right side plots of Figure 16 are scaled by a factor of 103. 
Some false positives remain simply because sometimes users form new cliques, and these 
situations cause false positives, which we cannot entirely avoid without modeling the 
dynamics of clique formation. (That remains as future research with preliminary results 
reported in [7].) 
 
 Figure 16. Average results. Upper left: Outbound, Lower Left: Inbound; varying 
number of recipients in each email.  Upper Right: Outbound, Lower right: Inbound; 
varying inter-arrival time in minutes. 
 
4.5 EMT Examples 
Here we demonstrate some real examples of the virus simulation test of EMT. Table 4 
displays a “dummy” injected viral email detected by the EMT models; the generated 
alerts are labeled “Y”, while “N” denotes normal. In the example, we can see that this 
user communicates with many different organizations. A virus searches the address book, 
picks up recipients randomly and sends itself four times. Each of the viral emails includes 
4 recipients, and the propagation rate (inter-departure time) is a randomly chosen 
schedule, from 0 to 30 minutes. The Hellinger model considers each sender-recipient pair 
as an individual event. An email sent to four recipients will be four records. The 
Hellinger model detects the anomalous email record after the second email (fifth record). 
These emails are all on the same day and the cumulative attachment distribution indicates 
an unusual jump in the rate of emission on this day. So, all of the emails with attachments 
for this user on that day had alerts issued. Note, too that all of the emails violate the 
user’s normal cliques. We can also see that the backward/forward scanning algorithm can 
recover the first viral email missed by the Hellinger model. 
Table 5, however, displays a false positive. In this case the user uncharacteristically sent 
an email with an attachment to different domains never before seen in the user’s history. 
Thus, a clique violation occurred, confirmed by a high rate of email emissions on that day 
causing a false alarm..  
Table 4. Real injected viral emails.  
He: Hellinger, Cu: Cumulative Analysis, Cl: Clique Model. 
 He Cu Cl Combination MailRef Time Recipient 
N Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:12:40 B1@baka.org 
N Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:12:40 CU1@cs.columbia.edu 
N Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:12:40 P1@pingnet.com 
Email 
1 
N Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:12:40 P2@pingnet.com 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:32:12 A1@allianttech.com 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:32:12 CU2@columbia.edu 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:32:12 Ta1@tamashunas.com 
Email 
2 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:32:12 CU3@cs.columbia.edu 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:33:59 CU4@cs.columbia.edu 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:33:59 L1@lucent.com 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:33:59 N2@nic.com 
Email 
3 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:33:59 P3@pingnet.com 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:54:41 Ot1@outpost.tanis.org 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:54:41 CU5@cs.columbia.edu 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:54:41 Acm1@acm.org 
Email 
3 
Y Y Y Y NA 2002-10-09 08:54:41 A2@allianttech.com 
Table 5. A real false positive email. 
H
e 
Cu Cl Combination 
MailRef 
Time Recipient 
N Y Y Y 1024036921 2002-06-14 02:42:01.0 Student1@cs.ucsb.edu 
N Y Y Y 1024036921 2002-06-14 02:42:01.0 Student2@cs.ucsb.edu 
Y Y Y Y 1024036921 2002-06-14 02:42:01.0 Employee1@ibm.com 
Y Y Y Y 1024036921 2002-06-14 02:42:01.0 CU1@columbia.edu 
Y Y Y Y 1024036921 2002-06-14 02:42:01.0 CU2@columbia.edu 
Y Y Y Y 1024036921 2002-06-14 02:42:01.0 CU3@columbia.edu 
N Y Y Y 1024036921 2002-06-14 02:42:01.0 CU4@cs.columbia.edu 
N Y Y Y 1024036921 2002-06-14 02:42:01.0 User1@icir.org 
 
Virus writers are constantly devising new ways of beating detection algorithms.  The 
behavior-based models presented in this paper provide an alternative to content-based 
detection methods and can serve as a foundation to detect new viruses. There are 
numerous avenues of research these techniques suggest.  Several are described in our 
concluding remarks. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have introduced in this paper several email behavior-based methods using principled 
statistical analysis techniques and described how these notions can be used in detecting 
viral email propagations. These methods complement traditional signature-based 
approaches to virus detection, and are aimed at detecting new viruses for which 
signatures have not yet been developed and deployed. This is the maximal period of 
vulnerability when a new virus does its damage.  
The methods described are representative of a range of behavior based analyses that may 
be performed for a wide range of general internet applications. Virus detection provides a 
good exemplar application since it is familiar to all users of the internet.  
In general, we find that fast and broad-based viral propagations sent to many victims are 
very easy to detect using behavior based techniques without content-based analyses. 
Stealthy and slow moving propagations remain a challenge. (We hope the next generation 
of viruses do not implement this tactic, but they probably will.) 
In particular, we have defined user cliques, and user email frequency behavior profiles. 
Three specific modeling techniques were combined, user cliques, Hellinger distance and 
the daily cumulative distribution of emails, to achieve high detection rates with 
remarkably good FP rates.  Tests on outbound traffic indicate that using EMT's combined 
models, a high detection rate can be achieved: 95% or more in general cases  with an FP 
rate ranging from about 0.38% in the best case to as high as 9% in the worst cases of very 
slow and stealthy propagations.  Tests on inbound traffic show similar results.  
The FP rate would translate to a different daily false alarm rate depending upon the user's 
email emission rate. In the general case, where one user's data exhibited one email per 
day with attachments, the outbound FP rate of 2% suggests that that user would have 
received one false alarm every 45 days for the outbound email. The FP rate of 1% of the 
user's inbound email suggests a false alarm once every 90 days.  
There are several areas of new research that can provide substantial improvement in 
several respects. We chose to use threshold settings for the models based upon a static 
prior period of time (the window size in Hellinger, and the “d” days in the cumulative 
distribution) and did not attempt to incorporate user-specific calibration. As noted in prior 
work, the choice of such parameters has a very big impact on detection performance (see 
Maxion [33]). Calibrating a detector and setting parameters specific to a user would 
logically improve individual detection performance for each user. Our current research 
includes strategies and techniques to best calibrate the detector for each user.  
Furthermore, detection is performed on a “per user profile” basis; we do not yet have 
performance results at the “enclave” level. This is particularly interesting in that shared 
statistics among a group of users would naturally inform a model more precisely about 
the onset of a viral propagation within an organization served by a single mail server. 
Any infected user would naturally propagate to members of their own organization (those 
the user frequently communicates with) and the combined statistics among multiple users 
would tend to favor early detection for all users. These shared statistics would make a 
viral propagation appear faster moving than would otherwise be seen by an individual 
victim. Furthermore, it is sensible that there would be a higher likelihood of detecting 
clique violations at the enclave level where more email traffic may be inspected.  
The models used here for clique violation are not only specific to a user, they are also 
static. We chose to analyze a user’s historical cliques without modeling the dynamics of 
clique formation and expiration. Clearly, conversations with different groups of folks 
would tend to be revealed by considering the dynamics of the interaction between the 
parties to a conversation. This is the subject matter of recent work by Kleinberg [17] 
where he considers the onset of new “content”, rather than new viral propagations, by 
stochastically modeling the flow of subject lines in email streams. Our current work is 
focused on modeling dynamic clique formations [7] which would logically improve the 
performance of clique violation models that consider shorter term statistics.  
The focus of this paper has been on viral propagation detection as an example of the 
power of behavior-based computer security. This concept is applicable to a far wider 
range of problems, including spam detection, security policy violations, and a host of 
other detection tasks of value to forensic analysis, evidence gathering and intelligence. It 
is important to note that testing EMT in a laboratory environment only suggests what its 
performance may be on specific tasks and source material. The behavior models are 
naturally specific to a site or particular accounts and thus performance will vary 
depending upon the quality of data available for modeling, and the parameter settings and 
thresholds employed.  
EMT is designed to be as flexible as possible so an analyst can effectively explore the 
space of models and parameters appropriate for their mission. An analyst simply has to 
take it for a test spin. For this reason, we have recently embarked on a collaboration with 
a police department of a major US city and their criminal intelligence division. EMT will 
be used by detectives and honed to tasks specific to their needs. We expect in the future 
to be able to report on the productivity gains EMT may offer when deployed for these 
law enforcement and intelligence applications.  
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